Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law
Volume 9

Number 2

Article 17

2014

Effects of the Factory Reset on Mobile Devices
Riqui Schwamm
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

Neil C. Rowe
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security
Commons

Recommended Citation
Schwamm, Riqui and Rowe, Neil C. (2014) "Effects of the Factory Reset on Mobile Devices," Journal of
Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 9 : No. 2 , Article 17.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2014.1182
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol9/iss2/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

Effects of the Factory Reset on Mobile Devices

JDFSL V9N2

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

EFFECTS OF THE FACTORY RESET ON
MOBILE DEVICES
Riqui Schwamm and Neil C. Rowe
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Computer Science Department
Monterey, CA 93943 USA
{rschwamm, ncrowe}@nps.edu

ABSTRACT
Mobile devices usually provide a “factory-reset” tool to erase user-specific data from the main
secondary storage. 9 Apple iPhones, 10 Android devices, and 2 BlackBerry devices were tested
in the first systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of factory resets. Tests used the Cellebrite
UME-36 Pro with the UFED Physical Analyzer, the Bulk Extractor open-source tool, and our
own programs for extracting metadata, classifying file paths, and comparing them between
images. Two phones were subjected to more detailed analysis. Results showed that many kinds
of data were removed by the resets, but much user-specific configuration data was left. Android
devices did poorly at removing user documents and media, and occasional surprising user data
was left on all devices including photo images, audio, documents, phone numbers, email
addresses, geolocation data, configuration data, and keys. A conclusion is that reset devices can
still provide some useful information to a forensic investigation.
Keywords: mobile device, forensics, factory reset, file types, Cellebrite, privacy

1.

INTRODUCTION

An increasing amount of criminal activity uses
mobile devices (McMillan, Glisson, and
Bromby, 2013). Devices do provide ways to
erase user information from secondary storage
and criminals will likely use them. However,
these methods are not entirely effective and
information of forensic value can be left after
these attempts to erase it. In addition, with
frequent device upgrades by manufacturers,
discarded older devices are common. This
paper attempts to determine how much and
what kind of residual user data are left after a
“factory reset” or “wipe” intended to remove
user data. This analysis will aid forensic
examiners that encounter reset drives.
Recently a number of researchers have
developed
methodologies
for
forensic
investigation of mobile devices (Marturana, et
al., 2011; Omeleze and Venter, 2013; Owen,

© 2014 ADFSL

Thomas, and McPhee, 2010). Systematic
analysis of mobile devices differs somewhat
from that of desktop and laptop computers
because of the difficulty of accessing the main
secondary storage, which is usually a flash
storage soldered to the device board. Cutting
out and removing the storage (Alghafli, Jones,
and Martin, 2012) usually destroys the device
functionality. Hence most mobile forensic
tools attempt to access the storage through
the operating system. Several issues particular
to mobile devices arise such as finding where
data are stored and dealing with data
aggregation.
For
instance,
on
most
smartphones the call records are stored in a
single file. In addition, the operating system
may not permit access to all files.
The term “factory reset” is used by
manufacturers to mean restoring an electronic
device to the state when it left the factory,
deleting all user data and third-party
Page 205
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applications in the process (Rouse, 2013). It
should be done when discarding a device or
transferring it to a new owner. The concept is
clear when referring to music players and
other simple devices, but its meaning is less
clear for complex mobile devices where some
user data may be necessary to configure it
adequately, and some user data are stored
within operating-system files.

are even worse if the data left on devices are
unpredictable as it appears to be from the
anecdotal reports.

No systematic testing appears to have
been done of the factory reset on mobile
devices, although technology websites report
gripes (The Guardian, 2013). For example,
(Smith, 2012) tested secondhand phones
purchased through Craigslist where a factory
rest had been performed on the devices. Data
that they found included court records, social
security
numbers,
resumes,
college
applications,
child
support
documents,
employee records, bank statements, creditcard statements, tax returns, email, contact
lists, and photos. One investigation (Cardwell,
2013) studied the effects of a factory reset on
network data left on an Android phone. Data
was transferred between Android phones and
multiple network access points (cellular,
wireless, and Bluetooth). Residual data in
secondary storage on test phones after the
reset included “userdata” partitions containing
Service
Set
Identifiers,
wireless-router
Subscriber Identity Modules, DHCP ACKs
from wireless routers, and base-station
metadata that included the Mobile Network
Code, Mobile Country Code, Local Area Code
and Cell Identification, wireless router Media
Access control addresses, and Bluetooth
addresses of devices paired with the phone.
These reports suggests that useful
forensics on reset devices is indeed possible.
They also raise worrisome questions about the
privacy of information stored on mobile
devices. Privacy of personal information is
currently subject of much attention (Payton
and Claypoole, 2014). If private data are left
on devices after users have reset them, users
may be able to sue manufacturers, and this
needs to be factored into business decisions
(Kauffman, Lee, and Sougstad, 2009). Matters
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2. EXPERIMENTAL
SETUP
Tools
from
Cellebrite
(www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensics)
were
used to extract data from the main storage of
test devices. The Cellebrite UME-36 Pro
Universal
Memory
Exchanger
1.2.2.3
hardware accessed the devices, and the
Cellebrite UFED Physical Analyzer 3.7.2.0
software analyzed the images. Other products
claiming similar functionality include the
Forensic
Toolkit
(www.accessdata.com),
Oxygen
Forensic
Suite
(www.oxygenforensic.com),
EnCase
Neutrino
(www.guideancesoftware.com),
Recuva
(www.piriform.com),
and
ViaExtract
(viaforensics.com). The Oxygen Forensic suite
was tested on some of our phones and it
appeared to work well. ViaExtract showed
compatibility issues with some Android
phones (the Samsung Galaxy SIII and the
Motorola Atrix 4G). Recuva is primarily for
hard drive recovery; it could extract small
data sets but did not provide useful analysis.
A full ufd-format dump of the file system
on each device was made by the Cellebrite
Physical Analyzer. A program was written to
calculate
DFXML
metadata
(www.nsrl.nist.gov/DFXML
/fileobject.xsd)
on the dumps, including calculation of hash
values on files. Another program discussed in
section 4.2 was written to compare the prereset and post-reset DFXML metadata. A
taxonomy from (Rowe, 2013) was used to
classify files by extension and directory. The
Bulk Extractor tool from digitalcorpora.org
(Garfinkel, 2013) was used to extract strings.
We did not exclude operating-system files
from analysis because our previous work
(Rowe, 2013) found some user data in them.
Except for two unresponsive phones and
also in section 3.4, resets were performed
through software using each device’s setup
menu under “Privacy” or “Backup & Reset”.
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The reset takes a few minutes after which the
device restarts.

2.1 Other Storage for Devices
This work focused on the main nonvolatile
storage. A separate removable memory card
on some phones (“SIM” or “subscriber identity
module”) contains the user’s identity, account
information, and keys, and is necessary to
make phone calls. It may also contain text
messages and contacts depending on the
phone. SIM cards were not available for most
of our phones. SIM cards are unaffected by a
factory reset and contain information of
definite forensic interest, so they should be
analyzed if available.
Besides SIM cards, many devices have
additional removable storage in the form of
SD or MMC cards that is not subject to the
factory reset. No such cards were available for
the devices tested in section 4, but 76 cards
comprising 54,279 files were acquired from
smartphone images from an international
corpus. Classifying its files by extension using
our taxonomy, 31.7% were camera pictures,
15.0% were audio, 11.8% were video, 5.6%
were documents, and 5.6% had no extension.
Hence these cards had rich materials for
forensic investigation compared with 4.3%
camera images, 4.8% audio, and 0.1% video
on the mobile-device main-storage corpus to
be described. That suggests that the cards
should be checked first when available in a
forensic investigation.

3. EXPERIMENTS WITH
TWO PHONES
To get a more detailed view of what a reset
accomplishes, experiments were done with an
Apple iPhone 4S phone (p18 in Table 3) and
an Android Samsung Galaxy SIII phone (p9),
after making copies of the original pre-reset
and post-reset images to use later. These
experiments placed specific files on the phones
that we thought should be deleted by a reset.
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3.1 Experimental Protocol
The phones were “factory-reset”; a protocol
was followed to put applications and data
onto the phones; images were taken of the
phone with the Cellebrite Physical Analyzer;
the phones were reset again; and images were
taken again. The furnished data included
distinctive keywords to make it easier to
recognize forensically. The phones were not
connected to a cellular account, so messaging
services could not be tested. The protocol
was:
1. Reset the device.
2. Visit four specified websites: nps.edu,
fark.com, yahoo.com, and npr.org.
3. Take six pictures with the built-in
camera and rename three distinctively.
4. Click on eight specified links to Web
pages and documents (4 html, 1 docx,
1 pdf, 1 pptx, and 1 wav file).
5. Download to the root directory of the
phone a specified text document and
zip file.
6. For the Android: (a) download and
install the Facebook app, login, and
browse specified pages; (b) download
and install the Google Drive app,
login/sync, and open three specified
files; (c) download and install the
DropBox (www.dropbox.com) app,
login/sync, and open three specified
files; (d) download and install the
YouTube app, login, and watch three
specified videos; (e) download and
install the Audible app, login, and
download three specified excerpts; (f)
download and install the Kindle app,
login, and open three specified PDF
files; and (g) download and install the
“Reddit Is Fun” app, and visit three
specified postings.
For the iPhone: (a) view three
YouTube videos with the installed
software;
(b) create three specified note entries
with the installed software; and (c)
create three specified reminders with
the installed software. (The iPhone
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does not allow download of arbitrary
software and files.)

3.2 Analysis of the Android Test Phone
On the Android, 5,141 files were recovered
pre-reset and 3,578 post-reset, of which 3,292
matched exactly in both path and contents.
After deleting partial matches or analogous
files (defined as being on filename and hash,
hash only, path only, or path ignoring digits),
there were 968 pre-reset and 65 post-reset files
that did not match in both path and contents
between pre-reset and post-reset images. We
conclude that 968 files were deleted and 65
were added by the reset. 278 of the post-reset
files had zero size of which 227 also had zero
size before the reset.
The number of
executable “.apk” files went from 396 to 277,
“.dex” files from 140 to 121, and “.so” files
from 302 to 254, so executables were not
filtered much by the reset. The “copies and
backup” category went from 512 to 33 files,
but otherwise the Android reset did not seem
to target any particular extensions or
directories.
The reset of the Android was not effective
at deleting emplaced files as it did not delete
any images taken with the camera, nor the
created txt, doc, pdf, and ppt files, nor some
cache and deleted copies of these files and

their image components. (The other Androids
similarly did not delete these files, so the
operating-system version did not affect this.)
The reset did delete most third-party
applications, but it had trouble with the
Kindle and DropBox applications and left
documents of the previous owner of the
phone. Using BulkExtractor, 116 links to
three visited Web sites were found pre-reset in
various files, but all were deleted post-reset.
The reset left intact many operatingsystem files; 1,971 files with modification
times older than one week before the reset
were present before the reset and exactly the
same number after. Our previous research
showed that user data may be contained in
operating-system files of settings and logs.
Table 1 lists some example files remaining
after the reset that could be interesting for
forensic purposes. None of the Android phones
still had a SD card and directories used to
store SD-card data were not specifically
searched. However, data was found under
‘USERDATA/Root/media/0’, which should
have been erased during a reset. Again, there
is a variety of indirect information about
usage in addition to the direct information of
the undeleted user files.

Table 1 Some Forensically Interesting Files on the Test Android after Reset
File
CACHE/Root/recovery/last_log
SYSTEM/Root/addon.d \/blacklist
SYSTEM/Root/etc/apns-conf.xml
SYSTEM/Root/etc/audio_policy.conf
SYSTEM/Root/etc/gps.xml
USERDATA/Root/backup/pending/journal2114683955.tmp
USERDATA/Root/data/com.android.providers.calendar
/databases/calendar.db
USERDATA/Root/data/com.android.deskclock/databases
/alarms.db
USERDATA/Root/media/0/amazonmp3/temp/log.txt
USERDATA/Root/media/0/Android/data/com.andrew.apollo
/cache/ImageCache/3910b1e0ccab19bc46fd9db27cca49c9.0
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Description
Ascii recovery log
Four hexadecimal MD5 hash values
Ascii phone carrier IP address
Ascii audio devices listing
Ascii GPS settings
Data backup
Ascii calendar data
Ascii alarm data
Ascii log file of Amazon Cloud
Player
Binary image cache data
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USERDATA/Root/media/0/iPhone3G.2013-11-07.16-39-30
/Email/108/478/1256.sql
USERDATA/Root/misc/wifi/softap.conf
USERDATA/Root/system/users/userlist.xml
USERDATA/Root/drm/fwdlock/kek.dat
USERDATA/Root/media/0/Android/data/com.dropbox.androi
d /files/scratch/09thesis_regan.pdf

3.3 Analysis of the iPhone Test Phone
On the iPhone, 61,276 files were recovered
pre-reset and 43,165 post-reset, of which
42,728 matched exactly in both path and
contents; iPhones had more files than
Androids. After deleting partial matches
(defined as in section 3.2), there were 17,914
pre-reset files and 115 post-reset that did not
match, so we conclude 17,914 files were
deleted and 115 added by the reset. 36,319 of
the post-reset files had zero size of which
36,292 were also had zero size before reset;
that indicates that zero-size files after the
reset convey some forensic information since
they are almost certainly present before the

Text database script of ours,
unclear how it got here
Ascii access-point data
Ascii User ID information
Lock data
PDF document of previous phone
user

reset. The number of executable “.app” files
went from 24,862 pre-reset to 8,062 post-reset,
but the number of files of all kinds in
recognizable operating-system directories went
from 29,812 to 27,621, so the operating-system
files were generally preserved.
The reset on the iPhone did well in
deleting most files put on it by user activity,
due to Apple’s tighter control on what can be
put on the phone.
All the images and
documents were deleted by the reset except
for some cache and settings information from
YouTube, and all third-party software except
for Facebook. Table 2, however, lists example
files
remaining
after

Table 2 Some Forensically Interesting Files on the Test iPhone after Reset
File
System/InnsbruckTaos11B554a.N90OS/System/Library/
PrivateFrameworks/Preferences.framework/
SupplementalLocaleData.plist
System/InnsbruckTaos11B554a.N90OS/usr/share/
mecabra/ja /rerank.dat
Data/Data/Keychains/keychain-2.db
Data/Data/logs/lockdownd.log
Data/Data/mobile/Applications/B8AD4B05-2518-45708447-7BE2BFDA8F9F/Library/Preferences/
com.apple.mobilesafari.plist
Data/Data/mobile/Library
/BulletinBoard/SectionInfo.plist
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Caches
/com.apple.springboard /Cache.db-wal
Data/Data/mobile/Library
/Cookies/com.apple.itunesstored.2.sqlitedb
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Mail/Content Index
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Maps/Bookmarks.plist
Data/Data/mobile/Library
/Preferences/com.apple.identityservicesd.plist
Data/Data/mobile/Media/PhotoData/changes-shm
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Description
Binary location and language settings

Binary resource rankings
Ascii keys
Ascii security event log
Ascii browser preferences

Ascii bulletin board index
Ascii screen cache for user "wal"
Ascii cookies for iTunes
Nonrandom encoded mail keywords
Ascii map bookmarks
Ascii account information
Incremental photo data
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File

Description

Data/Data/root/Library/Caches/locationd
/consolidated.db
Data/Data/tmp/MediaCache /diskcacherepository.plist

Ascii location data
Ascii disk cache information

the reset that could be interesting for forensic
purposes by providing indirect information
about what the user was doing. Despite
Apple’s claims (Apple, 2014) of using AES256 hardware encryption to protect user data
and deleting the key during a factory reset,
we did find unencrypted data in the form of
Ascii files in cache, log, and preference files
though its precise purpose was unclear. 115
new post-reset files did include files of forensic
value
in
directories
UserSettings,
EffectiveUserSettings,
com.apple.mobilemail/Cache, fsCachedData,
photostream, and bulletinboard, apparently
from the reset and subsequent rebooting, and
Table 2 includes some examples.

the hardware reset gave a new menu which
enforced a “cache reset” as well (an option for
the software reset). An image after this kind
of reset was taken on our test Android after
the regular reset, and 3391 files out of 3578
remained identical. It did not delete any of
the files and media put on the device, and
deleted only the sixth interesting file in Table
1. Only four files all with extension “db” were
deleted, two for Bluetooth and two for
“optables”. Six new files were added, two
Bluetooth cache files and four “telephony”
files. Thus it appears that the cache reset
does not do much beyond the regular reset,
though it apparently does not execute
identical code.

“Preferences” can include private user
information (Zhu et al., 2014) though we saw
none here. However just using the data we
found using BulkExtractor, an investigator
could determine where the user was, when
and how they used the device, their deleted
applications, network configuration, cache
data, keywords, and even some plaintext keys.

The iPhone hardware reset just sends the
user to the regular reset “Erase All Content
and Settings” used in section 3.2. But newer
iPhones provide six additional software reset
options that can confuse users: “Reset All
Settings”, “Reset Network Settings”, “Reset
Keyboard and Dictionary”, “Reset Home
Screen Layout”, and “Reset Location and
Memory”. In our experiments, all of these
were selected, an image taken, and the results
were compared to that of just doing the first
option. 222 additional files were deleted and
144 were added to the 43,165 files, so it did
delete additional files, but nothing in Table 2.
No obvious patterns were discerned in the
deletions. Thus it appears that the additional
reset options do not affect very much though
they do not execute identical code as the
regular reset.

Timeline analysis showed the reset
reduced the number of files with modification
times within the last month from 18,000
before the reset to 500 after the reset. On the
other hand, of the files with modification
times earlier than one week before the reset,
there were 43,984 before the reset and 42,468
after. It appears that older files are rarely
deleted in a reset, but it is unclear whether
this is due to their timestamps, location, or
contents.

3.4 Effects of Alternative Resets
Most devices provide an alternative “hardware
reset” using the hardware keys (with many
different device-specific procedures described
on factory-reset.com), and this is usually
coupled to rebooting. On the test Android,
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We also employed a “firmware reset” to
restore the test Android back to the standard
Android operating system after a regular
reset. We then took an image, did a regular
software reset, took an image, did another
software reset, and took a final image. The
second regular reset deleted 161 files and
added 259, and the third regular reset deleted
© 2014 ADFSL
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98 and added 88. This shows that effects of
the firmware reset were inconsistent even on a
previously reset device, which suggests
opportunities for investigators.

and were unmodifiable.
Others were
smartphones that have been used for other
research projects at our school and were
modifiable. Additional files were created and
downloaded for the modifiable devices
similarly to the experiments in section 3.
None of the phones were password-protected
and no data were explicitly encoded or
encrypted. Unlike in section 3, the devices
were not reset before taking pre-reset images
(and the two phones of section 3 were imaged
before the tests reported there) to test
persistence of a wider range of files.

4. EXPERIMENTS WITH
A SET OF DEVICES
4.1 The Mobile Corpus Used
To see how general this analysis was, pre-reset
and post-reset images of 21 previously owned
devices were analyzed (Table 3). Some were
from the Real Data Corpus (Garfinkel et al,
2009) of drives purchased as used equipment

Table 3 Devices Tested in Our Mobile Corpus
#
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
p11
p12
p13
p14
p15
p16
p17
p18
p19
p20
p21
p22
p23
p24
p25
p26
p27
p28

Device
Apple iPhone 4
Apple iPhone 4
Apple iPhone 2
Apple iPhone 2
Apple iPhone 2
Apple iPhone 2
Apple iPhone 2
Apple iPhone 2
Samsung Galaxy SIII
Samsung Nexus
Samsung Galaxy Anycall
Motorola Atrix 4G
HTC Droid Eris
HTC Magic
HTC Flyer (tablet)
HTC One
BlackBerry 8900 Curve
Apple iPhone 4S
Apple iPhone 2G
BlackBerry 8100 Pearl
BlackBerry 8300 Curve
Motorola FIRE
Huawei U8500
Huawei U8150 IDEOS Comet
Dell XCD35
Apple iPhone 2
Motorola Charm
LG-500GHL
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OS Version
5.1.1
5.1.1
3.1.3
3.1.3
3.1.3
3.1.3
3.1.3
3.0
CM 10.1
CM 10.1
1.5
2.2
2.1
1.6
3.2
4.1.2
4
5.1.1
3.13
4.5.0.174
4.5.0.162
2.3.4
2.1
2.2
2.2
3.1.3
2.1
Unknown

Status
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
Hard reset only
OK
OK
OK
OK
Hard reset only
OK
OK
Unusable after reset
OK
Unusable without SIM card
OK
OK
Unrecognized by Cellebrite
OK
Unusable after reset
OK
Unusable after reset
Totally dead
Unrecognized by Cellebrite
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The table lists the devices tested, with a
variety of manufacturers and operatingsystem versions to provide breadth to
experiments. Very few files were found on the
BlackBerry images and no software, so
Cellebrite appears to have had trouble
imaging them. Those not identified as Apple
or BlackBerry were Google Android devices,
and two had a custom operating system
CyanogenMod 10.1. The table indicates
several problems in using the devices,
resetting them, and analyzing them. Some
devices (p22 and p28) could not be handled at
all by Cellebrite. Some devices (p27) were
apparently faulty. Some (p19) had special
requirements that could not be accomplished.
Some (p9 and p14) had special requirements
for reset. Some (p17, p24, and p26) had a tooefficient reset that made the devices
subsequently unable to restart. Also, four
phones needed to be processed more than once
due to Cellebrite crashes. It appears that

forensic investigators will need to accept a
significant failure rate in attempts to analyze
devices they acquire.

4.2 Effects of Resets on File Counts
Many files were unchanged by the reset.
Table 4 gives a summary of pre-reset and
post-reset file counts. As before, there were
four types of partial matches between prereset and post-reset:
filename and hash
(typically, when a file is moved), hash only
(when a file is copied), path only (when a file
is modified), and path ignoring digits (for
temporary files). The “unmatched” files postreset are interesting as they represent new
records created by the reset itself and routine
operating-systems activity. As we saw in
section 3, resets do not simply erase devices;
they delete many files, but rename others and
add
some
new
ones.

Table 4 Summary Data on the 21 Usable Devices
File count type

Pre-reset

Post-reset

Total files
iPhone files
Android files
Exact matches pre-reset and post-reset
Subsequent matches on filename and hash value but not all
directories
Subsequent matches on hash value alone
Subsequent matches on full path alone
Subsequent matches on full path ignoring digits alone
Remaining unmatched

349,915
299,058
50,846
140,320
34,228

200,987
176,907
24,058
140,320
36,540

9,269
2,849
6,448
156,801

12,911
2,836
256
8,124

To get a better understanding of what
kinds of files are being removed, files were
classified by type of file extension (E) and
type of the immediate directory (D) (Table
5). Our current taxonomy classifies 8,346
extensions and 6,445 directory names, labeling
the rest as “miscellaneous”. Proposed
extensions longer than 10 characters were
ignored, and the file path above the bottomlevel directory was searched until a directory
was found which could be classified.
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Overall,
it
appears
that
resets
preponderantly target files with extensions of
pictures, video, documents, copies and
temporaries, disk images, logs, XML and
games. They had little effect on extensions of
operating-system files, configuration files, and
executable files. Results were similar with
classifying files by immediate directories. The
resets primarily targeted files in directories
mentioning pictures, video, documents,
temporaries, Web pages, applications, and
games. They had little effect on directories of
© 2014 ADFSL
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the operating system, security, and the root.
Thus resets appear to predominantly target
third-party software and some (but not all)
categories of likely user files, but ignore user
data in the operating system and other

configuration data. We observed that the
number and types of files deleted did not
differ significantly on the more-recent
operating systems (p10, p15, p16, and p18).

Table 5 File Type Counts Before and After Reset
Type of file
E: No extension
E: Operating system
E: Graphics
E: Camera pictures
E: Temporaries
E: Web pages
E: Documents
E: Spreadsheets
E: Compressed
E: Audio
E: Video
E: Source code
E: Executables
E: Disk image
E: Log
E: Copies and backup
E: XML
E: Configuration
E: Games
D: Root
D: Operating system
D: Hardware
D: Temporaries
D: Pictures
D: Audio
D: Video
D: Web
D: Data
D: Programs
D: Documents
D: Sharing
D: Security
D: Games
D: Applications

© 2014 ADFSL

Count before reset
36561
106168
98618
15443
733
1418
3089
425
601
16427
303
1791
3432
13828
599
7347
5193
20788
3741
1012
122625
1128
12141
17950
10812
2570
2714
18300
3616
6211
7500
2953
53722
84593

Count after reset
21078
104406
27522
3967
159
680
1233
356
278
8313
90
736
2856
1932
73
905
1045
18379
1048
966
117701
319
2928
4328
7814
0
277
9771
2876
1036
2368
2749
0
46696

Page 213

JDFSL V9N2
Zero-size files increased (120,112 before
and 128,026 after) but files whose path
contained the word “DELETED” decreased
(20,087 before and 4,181 after). Files are
designated for deletion for a good reason
and it would seem reasonable to delete them
in a reset. Zero-size files are useless to
software, but may provide information
about the user just in their zero size, as for
instance empty log files that say the user
has not done anything in the category of the
log. Investigators should be aware that the
Cellebrite software reported different fronts
of the paths, and also different creation and
access times, on the same image with
different releases of their software.

4.3 Cellebrite Analysis of Files
The devices were previously used for a
variety of purposes. Specific kinds of
information within files were searched for
using the Cellebrite Physical Analyzer
(Tables 6, 7, and 8). The rows correspond to
Cellebrite categories and the type codes are
I=iPhone, A=Android, and B=BlackBerry.
Cellebrite describes its categories as:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Application usage: application name,
number of launches, activations,
active time, and date
Call log: caller phone number, time
stamp, duration, and type (incoming,
outgoing, or missed)
Contacts: contacts name,
organizations, phone number, emails,
other entries, notes, and addresses
Cookies
Installed applications: application
name, version, identifier, application
ID, purchase date, and delete date
IP connections: timestamp, domain,
router address MAC address,
Cellular WAN, Device IP, DNS
address, and service name
Locations: timestamp, position, and
name
Maps: source, zoom level, and tiles
Passwords
SMS messages: timestamp, type of
folder, phone number, text string,
and sending status
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•
•
•
•
•

User accounts: name, user name,
password, and service type
User dictionary: word, locale, and
bookmark note
Wireless networks: last connected,
BSSId, SSId, and security mode
Content file types: picture images,
audio, text, databases, configuration,
application
Directory information: name, path,
size, metadata, created, modified,
accessed, bookmark note

One lesson of these tables is that effects
of resets differ between devices. To confirm
the results, the extracted data were viewed
in the Physical Analyzer. Nearly all the
connection data in both sets was removed
after a reset, including call logs, contacts,
cookies, IP connection data, SMS data,
maps, passwords, and user directories. But
location data were left on p6 (an IPhone) of
latitude and longitude for a cell tower and a
corresponding time stamp. This is sensitive
user information since it reveals the when
and where a user has been. Null account
data were found on several devices
indicating that a user account had existed at
some point. Null wireless network data also
occurred indicating a previous wireless
connection.
Applications
data
generally
only
contained information from first-party
software installed on the phone, indicated
by the identifier com.appl for iPhones and
com.google for Android phones. The data
was contained various framework, library,
and plug-in information for system software
including maps, video, mobile mail,
calculators, weather, preferences, and mobile
notes which could be considered user data.
The application data on p16 contained useraccount information before the reset, but
the Physical Analyzer mislabeled it as
installed applications. It also could not
identify any installed applications on the p7
and p8 iPhones after the factory reset but
there must have been some or the phone
would not have functioned.
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Table 6 Data Counts (Post-Reset/Pre-Reset) on Test Devices, Part 1
Phone

p1

p2

p3

p4

p5

p6

p7

p8

Type
App. Usage
Call Log

I
0/0
0/0

I
0/0
0/2

I
1/199
0/103

I
0/0
0/0

I
1/125
0/107

I
1/56
0/104

I
9/23
0/13

I
0/23
0/105

0/209
0/5
23/127
0/2
0/1
0/12
0/0
0/30
1/1
0/161
0/1
2488/
16541
2/2512
11/392
13/60
1349/
4798
164/
489

0/0
0/0
28/34
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/0
1/1
0/0
0/0
2631/
2716
1/1
20/34
21/50
1976/
2969
227/
304

0/1461
0/0
23/142
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1152
1/1
0/30
0/0
2488/
25106
2/1202
11/1689
23/54
1352/
6978
164/
458

0/2366
0/43
23/56
0/1
5/10
0/2
0/0
0/50
1/6
0/312
0/0
5888/
14477
2/1125
12/67
12/63
1345/
2237
164/
200

0/0
0/0
0/24
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/1
0/0
0/0
2491/
2611
2/2
12/21
13/24
1348/
1382
164/
310

0/284
0/6
0/79
0/7
0/72
0/19
0/0
0/672
1/3
0/819
0/0
2488/
13705
2/1120
12/135
23/55
1349/
10930
164/
670

Contacts
Cookies
Installed Apps.
IP Connections
Locations
Maps
Passwords
SMS Messages
User Accounts
User Dictionary
Wireless Networks
Images
Audio
Text
Databases
Configuration
Applications
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0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
34/34
34/34
0/2
0/2
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/6
0/5
0/0
0/2
0/0
1/1
0/0
0/1
0/0
1/1
3714/
3715/
3716
3716
1/1
1/1
159/161 159/164
31/38
32/43
2797/
2831/
2969
2959
6/
6/
6
10
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Table 7 Data Counts (Post-Reset/Pre-Reset) on Test Devices, Part 2
Phone
Type
App. Usage
Call Log
Contacts
Cookies
Installed Apps.
IP Connections
Locations
Maps
Passwords
SMS Messages
User Accounts
User Dictionary
Wireless Networks
Images
Audio
Text
Databases
Configuration
Applications
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p9

p10

p11

p12

p13

p14

p15

p16

A
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
30/30
0/0
0/0
0/15
0/0
0/80
1/1
0/132
0/1
150/
150
1/1

A
1/139
0/0
0/5
0/3
48/102
0/2
0/0
0/5
0/0
0/5
1/1
0/50
0/1
764/
764
1/1

A
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
25/43
0/0
0/5
0/8
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
11
/11
1/1

A
0/102
0/52
0/48
0/0
23/32
0/3
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/121
0/0
0/84
0/1
1815/
1815
1/1

A
0/0
0/5
0/0
0/0
26/70
0/0
0/10
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/40
0/0
42/
42
0/0

A
0/0
0/6
0/2
0/5
20/24
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/2
0/1
0/1
0/0
15/
15
4/4

A
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
12/44
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1
9/
9
1/1

130/13
0
5/65
0/0
0/0

48/48

0/0

1/1

0/0

4/4

12/45
0/0

0/0
0/0
0/0

132/13
2
25/41
0/0
7/7

A
0/0
7/192
0/65
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/66
0/1
0/0
0/0
616/
616
243/26
3
1/1

0/0
0/0
3/3

10/24
0/0
1/1

0/0
0/0
24/24

16/36
0/0
0/3

313/31
3
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Table 8 Data Counts (Pre-Reset/Post-Reset) on Test Devices, Part 3
Phone
Type
App. Usage
Call Log
Contacts
Cookies
Installed Apps.
IP Connections
Locations
Maps
Passwords
SMS Messages
User Accounts
User Dictionary
Wireless Networks
Images
Audio
Text
Databases
Configuration
Applications

p18

p20

p21

p25

A
0/0
0/1
0/0
0/17
34/34
1/6
0/0
0/0
5/9

I
0/0
0/100
0/477
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0

B
0/0
0/11
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0

B
0/0
0/61
5/252
0/16
0/1
0/0
0/9
0/0

0/0
1/1
0/6
3/7
3716/3743
1/1
243/263
37/58
2850/2953
6/6

0/4
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/ 7
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0

0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/3
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0

The Androids did not delete any user
pictures. The iPhones did a better job and
no pictures including thumbnails were
viewable after the factory reset. However,
metadata (name, file path, size, created,
modified, accessed) for the images was still
viewable in the Physical Analyzer and this
could violate privacy. Audio data were not
removed from any of the Android set,
including wav audio files from applications
and user-downloaded mp3 files. The iPhone
set deleted most of the audio files, but some
WAV files were still recoverable from the
operating system and third-party software,
and could be played on a media player.
Database data (db, sqlite, and sql) were
recovered from both sets but did not include
any user data. What Cellebrite called
configuration data was recovered from the
iPhones but only contained system-file
access data.

4.4 String Searches in Post-Reset Files
String searching was also done with Bulk
Extractor for specialized kinds of strings,
including those within encoded files such as
© 2014 ADFSL

• 0/1
0/76
0/2
0/2
0/1
71/159
1/1
440/3031
24/55
0/0
388/390

compressed files, and with the Unix “grep”
for Ascii strings in text files. We chose a
sample of keywords indicating possible userrelated security information including
“password”, “root certificate”, “hash”, “cert”,
“SHA1”, “MD4”, and “SSL”. The p10
Android phone with Cyanogen was the only
one that returned a value with the
“password” keyword after reset, in an XML
file under the Cyanogen system directory
that contained website URLs and user
names with passwords stored in clear text.
All phones returned at least one file that
contained the “root certificate” phrase and
had a length between 115 and 144. Searches
for the strings “hash”, “cert”, “SHA1”, “MD5”,
and “SSL” matched some configuration files,
but they did not appear to contain any user
data.
“Hash” occurred in post-reset
configuration files for iPhones on which we
found the application “Rocky Racoon” (p3,
p4, p5, p6, p7, and p8), an application on
“jailbroken” iPhones that try to circumvent
the operating system. Such unauthorized
software can damage a phone and may have
affected the data.
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Bulk Extractor also found email
addresses, fax numbers, and phone numbers
within files. However, most findings were in
manuals,
acknowledgements,
service
agreements, and support information for
system software, recognizable by such
strings as “@tech” and “@helpdesk” and 1800 information phone numbers. The reset
did appear to remove user-account and WiFi information. However, Bulk Extractor
found several text files with IP addresses
and domain names. Geolocation data were
found along with timestamps on p18,
enabling a view of the locations at which the
phone had been used.
Bulk Extractor claimed to uncover text
files that were not found by Cellebrite, for
an additional 157 user files on the Android
phones. Some of these were left behind by
third-party applications such as DropBox
where the reset removed the software but
not all the data. These included Microsoft
Office files (Word, Excel), Adobe PDFs, and
MP4 video files.

5.

CONCLUSION

Files and data on 21 devices were analyzed
before and after a “factory reset” and a
variety of residual user information was
found. Android devices did not delete most
emplaced user files in the reset, and both
Android and iPhones did not delete a
variety of indirect data from and about
users. On average 42% of the files on a
device were deleted by the reset, with
pictures, documents, copies, temporaries,
logs, drive images, and games singled out for
predominant
removal,
though
some
examples of each of these were spared.
Modified files were also found after the
reset, and even some new files, which
reflected routine system operations. The
year of the operating-system release did not
affect results much. 7 of our original 28
devices could not be imaged either post-reset
or pre-reset, so there was a significant
failure rate which will probably be similar
for other investigations of mobile devices.
These results
understood about
reverse-engineer
The results were
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show that much can be
resets without having to
operating-systems code.
dependent on Cellebrite

software, and it appeared to miss 157 files
on the Androids. However, it is the major
vendor of mobile-device forensic software
and has had years of successful use, so the
data it provided is likely highly accurate.
These results have implications both for
forensic investigations and for user privacy.
Users are confronted with confusing choices
for resets on both the iPhone (six options)
and the Android (three options), so they
may not reset what they want, and this
provides a forensic opportunity. Even with a
proper reset, Androids do not delete much
of forensic interest, and both Androids and
iPhones left plenty of clues to the device
usage in the remaining files, although it
becomes harder to extract them once a
device has been reset. Software applications
were major targets of the resets, but they
are only occasionally interesting forensically.
The number and kinds of files that were
recoverable after the reset varied between
devices and operating-system versions,
consistent with the experiments of (Kubi,
Saleem, and Popov, 2011) with extracting
other kinds of data from mobile devices, so
there are few guarantees about what gets
deleted.
As for implications for user privacy,
further measures need to be taken by users.
Users can encrypt their data, though it
imposes an additional burden on them and
it was not seen on our devices. For now, a
user wishing to discard or give away the
device, should (1) do a software or “factory”
reset; (2) manually delete any remaining
user files that have been moved to
unconventional locations (like a compressed
file in the root directory); (3) manually
delete remaining user data from software
directories; (4) delete remaining cache files,
browser history files, cookies, and settings
files; (5) delete zero-size files; (6) overwrite
deleted data with zeros; (7) remove the SIM
card and any other removable storage.
Commercial software such as data erasing
tools will be generally necessary for steps 2,
3, and 6.
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